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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀect of globalization on public expenditures allocated to diﬀer-
ent stages of education. First, we derive theoretically that globalization’s inﬂuence on
education expenditures depends on the type of government. For benevolent governments,
the model suggests that expenditures for higher education will increase and expenditures
for basic education will decline with deepening economic integration. For Leviathan gov-
ernments, on the other hand, the eﬀects of globalization on public education spending
cannot be unambiguously predicted. In the second part of the paper, we empirically ana-
lyze globalization’s inﬂuence on primary, secondary, and tertiary education expenditures
with panel data covering 104 countries over the 1992 - 2006 period. The results indi-
cate that globalization has led in both industrialized and developing countries to more
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Globalization has received considerable attention in the political economy literature. One
reason is that deliberate political actions such as trade liberalization and the abandonment of
international capital controls have promoted the emergence of globalization.1 An alternative
explanation is that many studies dealing with the consequences of global economic integra-
tion examine how globalization has aﬀected various domains of public policy. This includes
especially the question whether a higher degree of global economic integration has changed
the scope and limits of policy-making (Schulze and Ursprung, 1999).
From the public ﬁnance perspective, the literature highlights the implications of global-
ization for governments’ ability to collect tax revenue. The main hypothesis investigated is
whether the loss of governments’ monopoly of coercion and strategic interactions with other
governments competing for ﬁscal revenues has aﬀected the design of tax systems (Aizenman
and Jinjarak, 2009; Hines and Summers, 2009). In this context, one idea that suggests itself
is whether taxes have shifted from mobile production factors such as capital to less mobile
factors such as labor (Rodrik, 1997; Schwarz, 2007; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986). Even
though such investigations are enlightening, it should not be overlooked that labor, especially
high-skilled labor, nowadays also more easily transcends national borders, albeit not as much
as capital (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006; Egger and Radulescu, 2009; Grogger and Hanson,
2011). As a result, one may wonder whether governments have adjusted the composition of
education expenditures in response to the threat of emigration of those who have received
state-ﬁnanced education.
Following such considerations, this paper investigates the eﬀect of globalization on the
composition of public education expenditures. We derive theoretically that readjustments
of educational policies due to globalization are determined by the extent to which global
economic integration aﬀects (i) wages for diﬀerent types of labor and (ii) mobility costs. By
aﬀecting wages and mobility costs, i.e. the “economic variables” in our model, globalization
has an indirect eﬀect on the ﬁscal policy of governments (tax rates and expenditures for
diﬀerent educational programs).
The model derives that the eﬀect of globalization on public education expenditures depends
on whether the government is benevolent or a Leviathan (i.e. a government that is only
interested in maximizing tax rents). For example, let us assume that globalization increases
the returns to high-skilled labor. The reaction of a benevolent government is straightforward:
it will always seek to increase expenditures for higher education because this policy maximizes
the aggregate income of its citizens. The reaction of a Leviathan government, on the other
1Note that the underlying driving force behind globalization are technological advances in transportation,
communication, and the processing of information that are only weakly inﬂuenced by policy-makers (James,
2002). Cohen (1996) refers to political-driven versus technology-driven globalization as the “liberal” and
“realist” models. In addition, he mentions two other perspectives emphasizing the role of the domestic political
process and the importance of political culture and belief systems.
2hand, is unpredictable. A Leviathan government has an incentive to increase expenditures for
higher education because this policy would maximize the tax base (by maximizing aggregate
income). Yet, individuals with a higher earnings potential (the product of education and
returns to labor) are more likely to emigrate for ﬁscal reasons, thereby reducing the tax base.
This consideration incentivizes the Leviathan government to reduce education expenditures
for the high-skilled if returns for high-skilled labor increase (as this reduces their earnings
potential). In general, it is unclear whether the incentives to increase or decrease education
expenditures will prevail for a Leviathan government.
Due to such countervailing eﬀects, the net inﬂuence of globalization on the government’s
educational priorities is essentially an empirical matter. We therefore confront our research
question with data in the second part of the paper and conduct a dynamic panel analysis based
on System GMM estimations for 104 countries over the 1992 - 2006 period.2 An important
challenge for the empirical analysis is to control for factors that might be correlated with both
education expenditures and globalization. In particular, there is evidence that technological
progress confers a wage-premium to high-skilled work, and this wage-premium might induce
governments to increase spending for higher education (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987, 1991).3
As technological change is presumably correlated with globalization, not controlling for it
could result in biased estimates.
The estimation results reveal that globalization has induced governments in developed as
well as developing countries to reduce spending for primary and increase spending for sec-
ondary and tertiary education. Most likely, students from socio-economically disadvantaged
backgrounds beneﬁt predominantly from primary education expenditures, while students with
a wealthy background beneﬁt more from higher education expenditures (Blanden and Machin,
2004; Hansen and Weisbrod, 1969). We therefore conclude that the eﬀect of globalization on
the composition of public education expenditures may widen the gap between rich and poor
in the long-run.4
While the shift in educational priorities towards higher education reduces equity, the eﬀect
from an eﬃciency point of view is ambiguous. On the one hand, there is evidence that
in developing countries the ‘social rate of return’ to public resources invested at the primary
level is higher than for public expenditures on higher education levels (Carnoy, 1992; Lockheed
2In a previous version of our paper (Baskaran and Hessami, 2010), we used a slightly diﬀerent set of control
variables, which resulted in a panel with 121 countries. The smaller number of countries in this paper is due
to the use of gross enrollment rates instead of the population shares of the age groups that are relevant for
a particular type of education (primary, secondary, or tertiary) as the control for the “theoretical demand”
for that type of education, and the inclusion of the number of internet users per 100 persons as a control for
technological change. Despite these diﬀerences, the results and conclusions are similar.
3We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
4W¨ alde (2000) explains the negative relationship between the share of primary education expenditures and
income inequality by deriving that a higher share of secondary and tertiary expenditures provides incentives
for the development of technologies. These technologies in turn lead to a replacement of unskilled by skilled
labor that gives rise to a higher extent of income inequality.
3and Verspoor, 1991; Psacharopoulos, 1985).5 This would suggest that the observed shift in
educational priorities is ineﬃcient. On the other hand, increased expenditures for higher
education can be justiﬁed from an eﬃciency perspective by alluding to the fact that an
increasingly technology-driven world characterized by ﬁerce international competition requires
more high-skilled labor.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature
on the linkages between globalization and education expenditures. Section 3 discusses the
relationship between globalization and public expenditures for diﬀerent educational stages in
the context of a theoretical model. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical strategy,
while the results of the empirical investigation are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes
the analysis.
2 Globalization and public education: a literature review
The implications of globalization for public education are studied in several social sciences,
each of which emphasize diﬀerent aspects of educational policies (Spring, 2008). For instance,
the sociological and pedagogical literature primarily analyze whether globalization leads to
a convergence of nationally diverse education systems (Green, 1999), whether it causes a
“commodiﬁcation”6 of education (Naidoo and Jamieson, 2005), and whether international
organizations increasingly aﬀect the design of educational systems in developing countries
(McNeely, 1995).
While the analysis of globalization’s inﬂuence on diﬀerent aspects of educational policies
brings to light interesting insights, one has to acknowledge that educational policy has many
dimensions. Hence, an analysis that is intended to examine the overall eﬀect of globaliza-
tion on educational policies needs to be based on a more aggregated measure. To this end,
researchers usually resort to data for public spending on education. The impact of global-
ization on public education expenditures is primarily analyzed by economists and political
scientists. The relevant theoretical contributions can be subdivided into two groups linking
globalization with education expenditures through two distinct channels. The ﬁrst strand of
the literature is based on the tax competition perspective. In this view, globalization is un-
derstood to increase the mobility of the high-skilled, which impedes the government’s ability
to tax high-income earners. The reduction of the tax base has in turn an inﬂuence on public
education expenditures.
5Note that Birdsall (1996) challenges the prevalent view that public resources for education in developing
countries should be reallocated from higher to lower levels of education. Her main argument is that the
available measures for social rates of returns to education do not capture all relevant dimensions.
6Education is generally regarded as a means for social development, democratic empowerment and the
advancement of well-being and economic development of societies. The term “commodiﬁcation” of education
refers to the fact that education is increasingly understood as an economic factor, while students are looked
upon primarily as consumers of education serving as human capital for the labor market.
4One example for the tax competition approach is a study by Andersson and Konrad (2003b)
that analyzes theoretically how globalization aﬀects private education eﬀort and public edu-
cation policies under the assumption of a Leviathan government. In their model, governments
can decrease the private costs of education by appropriate public policies (which can be un-
derstood as expenditures) and thus motivate individuals to acquire more education. More
educated individuals earn a higher wage and thus provide a larger tax base, but they also
emigrate more easily if the domestic tax rate is too high. The authors derive that, in general,
it cannot be determined whether globalization induces governments to decrease the private
costs of education suggesting no clear-cut link between globalization and total education
expenditures.7
As the second contribution following the tax competition approach Haupt and Janeba
(2009) assume that the government seeks to redistribute income from high- to low-skilled
individuals by (which may seem paradoxical at ﬁrst) providing the high-skilled with education
subsidies. As a result, the future income of the high-skilled increases and this in turn causes
the tax base to grow. The derivations suggest that globalization reduces public education
subsidies since high-skilled individuals can emigrate more easily in a globalized world. This
forces the government to lower the tax rate in equilibrium. To conclude, an increase in the tax
base due to public education expenditures does not beneﬁt the low-skilled as much as it does
in a world with closed economies. Hence, the government reduces total education spending
in an increasingly globalized world.
Poutvaara and Kanniainen (2000) arrive at a similar, albeit more extreme, conclusion by
illustrating theoretically how costless mobility and international tax competition jeopardize
the existence of the public education system. In the presence of positive externalities in ed-
ucation and complementarities in production of low- and high-skilled workers, it is derived
that the low-skilled beneﬁt indirectly from the education that the high-skilled receive. This
leads to a voluntary social contract, which is implemented by means of a tax system through
which both groups contribute to the ﬁnancing of public education expenditures. When cost-
less mobility is introduced in the model, the voluntary social contract breaks down due to
high-skilled workers emigrating to low-tax countries after they have received their education
and low-skilled workers free-riding on investments in education in other countries.8 One pos-
sible solution to this dilemma is provided by Poutvaara (2001), where it is argued that the
downward pressure on tax rates and public education spending can be mitigated by obliging
the educated to pay taxes in the country where they have obtained their education.
Finally, Poutvaara (2008) provides an extension to the aforementioned studies by drawing
a distinction between diﬀerent subjects that are taught in higher education institutions. He
7Andersson and Konrad (2003a) further extend this paper and analyze the welfare implications of the
availability of private insurance in a world with costless mobility of the highly-educated and risky investments
in education.
8On the other hand, Poutvaara (2000) shows that tax competition may also encourage investment in
education as mobility insures individuals against region-speciﬁc shocks to the returns to education.
5argues that governments are aware of the increasing diﬃculty of taxation due to the threat
of emigration. Therefore, governments react to globalization by reducing funding for ﬁelds
of studies where the skills acquired are internationally transferable such as engineering. At
the same time, governments provide more ﬁnancial resources for subjects that are country-
speciﬁc, such as law. This shift of education spending between diﬀerent ﬁelds of studies is a
valuable extension to previous investigations. However, due to the diﬃculty of obtaining data
for such a detailed analysis, there is so far no empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
The empirical evidence regarding globalization’s eﬀect on total education expenditures is
mixed, which is not surprising given the disagreements in the theoretical literature. Dreher
et al. (2008) ﬁnd that globalization has not aﬀected the share of education spending in total
public expenditures. In contrast, according to Avelino et al. (2005) trade openness was posi-
tively related to education spending in Latin America during the 1980 - 1999 period. Shelton
(2007) tests a large number of determinants of public education expenditures simultaneously
in order to avoid omitted variable bias. His analysis suggests that globalization has no eﬀect
on public education expenditures. One reason why most of these studies fail to identify sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects of global economic integration on educational policies is that these eﬀects may
only be observed at lower levels of aggregation.
The second strand of the theoretical literature emphasizes the eﬀect of increased trade
on wages for low- and high-skilled labor and discusses how this distortion in wages aﬀects
educational policies. Ansell (2008), as the only theoretical contribution along these lines,
bases the analysis entirely on the Heckscher-Ohlin model and derives that the impact of
globalization on education expenditures diﬀers between developed and developing countries.
In developing countries, primary education expenditures are expected to increase relative
to tertiary education expenditures, whereas the opposite eﬀect is expected for developed
countries.
Based on estimations with country averages over the 1990s, Ansell (2008) ﬁnds conﬁr-
mation for the implications of the theoretical analysis. However, the investigation neglects
the dynamics of both globalization and the composition of public education expenditures.
In addition, given the studies that refute the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem regarding globaliza-
tion’s inﬂuence on wages in developing countries (Goldberg and Pavenik, 2007) the theoretical
foundation for Ansell’s ﬁndings might be questioned.
The above literature review illustrates that the bulk of the literature examining global-
ization’s inﬂuence on public education emphasizes the role of tax competition. In addition,
it has to be noted that the studies in the tax competition literature focus on the eﬀect of
globalization on aggregate education expenditures while neglecting eﬀects on the composition
of education spending. The only study analyzing globalization’s inﬂuence on the composition
of public education expenditures that we know of, Ansell (2008), is exclusively based on the
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. However, this theorem hardly ﬁnds conﬁrmation in the empirical
6literature. Moreover, evidence in favor of this theoretical model by Ansell is based on one
cross-sectional investigation alone.
The contribution of our paper is that we address each of the aforementioned shortcomings.
First, we derive a theoretical model that incorporates domestic adjustments in taxation due to
global economic integration, while at the same time taking into account globalization’s eﬀect
on wages as identiﬁed in the empirical literature. Second, the implications of the theoretical
model are tested by investigating globalization’s inﬂuence on spending for primary, secondary
and tertiary education. Third, we conduct our estimations with panel data and apply dynamic
estimation techniques in order to make use of the over-time variation in our dataset.
3 Theoretical model
In this section, we develop a stylized model to study the link between globalization and
public expenditures for diﬀerent educational stages. More speciﬁcally, after setting up the
basic structure of the model in sections 3.1–3.3, we explore in section 3.4 how globalization
aﬀects the endogenous variables in the model, i.e. public education expenditures and the
domestic tax rate.
3.1 Individuals
Consider a country with a population mass of 1. An individual i ∈ H,L has an exogenously
given ability that qualiﬁes her for one and only one type of labor: “high-skilled” (H) or “low-
skilled” (L) work. The wage that this individual earns for one unit of eﬀective labor is wi. The
eﬀective labor supply of individual i depends on the amount of public expenditures gi that
the government invests in her education. Public education expenditures are hence assumed
to be productivity-enhancing. Individual i’s market income νi is consequently speciﬁed as
νi(wi,gi) with dνi
dwi > 0, dνi
dgi > 0, d2νi
dg2
i
< 0, and d2νi
dgidwi > 0.
These assumptions imply (i) that increasing wages and an increasing eﬀective productivity
due to more funding for the relevant educational stages raise the market income of individual
i; (ii) that education expenditures have a diminishing marginal eﬀect on income; and (iii)
that the marginal eﬀect of education expenditures on income rises with higher wages.
The idea behind these assumptions is that the ability and talents of the individuals in
the model are not substitutable. An individual with analytical abilities can only pursue an
academic career, whereas an individual with practical skills can only work in “practical jobs”.
However, possessing the respective abilities is not suﬃcient. Individuals have to receive an
appropriate education before their talent can be productively applied.
This set-up of the model implicitly assumes that high-ability individuals do not beneﬁt
from increased funding for basic education, and vice versa. In essence, we are assuming
that diﬀerent ability types are educated separately. In reality, this is of course not true. In
7many countries, low- and high-skilled individuals are educated jointly during primary and to
some extent even during secondary school; tracking only occurs during the later stages of their
educational careers. Therefore, high-ability individuals who eventually acquire secondary and
tertiary education will beneﬁt to some extent from additional funding for primary education.
The question is whether such beneﬁts can be ignored for modeling purposes. There is reason
to believe that such an approach is justiﬁable. High-ability individuals are likely to master
the skills taught in primary schools – reading, writing, and basic mathematics – as long as
these schools fulﬁll some minimum quality requirements; increased funding is not likely to
improve their educational outcomes substantially at this stage of their educational careers.
In addition, to the extent that the ability of students and their family background in terms of
wealth and educational achievements of parents are correlated, high-ability students should
have better opportunities to acquire critical skills outside of (potentially low-quality) schools.
For these reasons, increased funding for primary education will, on balance, help low-ability
students much more than high-ability students (see also Hansen and Weisbrod (1969) and
Blanden and Machin (2004) on this).
3.1.1 Emigration
One important constraint the government faces when formulating its ﬁscal policy is that
individuals may emigrate if the tax burden is too high.9 To model such mobility decisions,
we presume that every individual takes the tax rate into account when deciding whether to
emigrate or not. Individuals will remain in the home country if the following condition holds:
(1 − t)νi + ǫi ≥ (1 − tF)νi − x, (1)
with tF denoting the tax rate in case of emigration (the “foreign” tax rate), x denoting the
costs of emigration, ǫi a random parameter that measures the home attachment of a given
individual, and νi denoting individual i’s income. We assume that ǫi ∼ U(0,1), i.e. that home
attachment is uniformly distributed over [0,1]. An individual will emigrate if the diﬀerence
between his net-income in the foreign country is larger than her home attachment and the
mobility costs.
Given that ǫi is random, every individual’s mobility decision is stochastic. The probability
πi that an individual will remain in the country can be expressed as a function of the domestic
tax rate and the mobility costs:
πi = πi(νi,t,x) = F(ǫi ≥ z) = 1 − z, (2)
with z = (t − tF)νi − x, dπi
dt = −νi, dπi
dx = 1, and dπi
dνi = −(t − tF).
9Assuming that the production factors are supplied endogenously would lead to an alternative tax base
eﬀect. We ignore this eﬀect in order to keep the model tractable.
8Note that even though neither home attachment nor mobility costs vary between individu-
als, the fact that they evaluate their net-incomes when deciding whether to emigrate implies
that high-income (and thus high-ability) individuals are more likely to emigrate for tax pur-
poses: given a proportional tax, wealthier individuals gain more in absolute terms. Note
furthermore that we treat the foreign tax rate as exogenously ﬁxed. There will be, there-
fore, no explicit tax competition between the domestic and foreign governments. Instead,
the domestic government takes the foreign tax rate as given. Given the types of domestic
governments that we analyze below, this assumption is appropriate. That is, we analyze
education expenditure choices for both benevolent and Leviathan governments. As we will
show below, a benevolent government concerned with maximizing the aggregate income of its
citizens (irrespective of whether they eventually decide to emigrate or not) disregards inter-
national diﬀerences in tax rates and how these aﬀect mobility decisions. Only for a Leviathan
government, tax competition will matter. But empirically, the assumption of a Leviathan
governments is more appropriate for poor and economically weak countries. In general, these
countries have to take the tax rates of foreign and economically powerful countries as given.
We assume furthermore that tF is suﬃciently small relative to x and ǫi, so that the foreign
tax rate represents a binding constraint on the tax policy on the domestic government. We
also exclude for simplicity the possibility of immigration from foreign countries.
3.2 The government
As indicated previously, we derive the equilibrium ﬁrst under a benevolent government and
then under a Leviathan government.
3.2.1 Benevolent governments











under the constraint t
R 1
0 πiνi di =
R 1
0 gi di and with gi ≥ 0,0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Thus, the government
is exclusively concerned with maximizing the aggregate income of its citizens, irrespective
of whether they emigrate or not. Furthermore, total tax revenues equal total education
expenditures in an equilibrium with a benevolent government, and the only individuals that
can be taxed are those that remain in the country. Therefore, education expenditures perfectly







9Diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to gi gives as ﬁrst-order condition
dνi
dgi
− 1 = 0 ∀i. (5)
Interpreting this ﬁrst-order condition is straightforward. In equilibrium, a benevolent govern-
ment chooses education expenditures gi = gb∗
i for individual i such that the marginal increase
in income equals the social costs of providing another unit of education for that individual,








i ) di. Note that this equilibrium eﬀectively implies a redistribution from
those that remain in the home country to those that emigrate. Given, as argued above, that
the high-skilled and thus high-earning individuals are more likely to emigrate, the educa-
tional policy by a benevolent government that maximizes aggregate income leads eﬀectively
to redistribution in favor of the high-skilled.10
3.2.2 Leviathan governments
The assumption of benevolent governments might not be appropriate for several countries;
in particular developing countries are often ruled by governments that can be characterized
as Leviathans: politicians who seek to maximize their own incomes (Andersson and Konrad,
2003b). We therefore analyze in this section the equilibrium assuming that the government
is exclusively concerned with rents R deﬁned as tax receipts minus total expenditures for






(tπiνi − gi)di (6)
with gi ≥ 0,0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
Thus, education expenditures that increase individuals’ incomes are only of interest to the
government as far as they lead to higher rents.
In contrast to the case with a benevolent government – where taxes were determined resid-
ually – education expenditures and the tax rate are determined simultaneously when the
government is a Leviathan. The reason is that the government is interested in tax revenues
not only to fund education expenditures, but also in order to ﬁnance its own consumption.
Maximizing equation (6) with respect to gi reveals that education expenditures are char-









νi − 1 = 0 ∀i. (7)
10This result would change, of course, if the government maximized aggregate utility and not aggregate
income. However, utility is unobservable in reality, and most governments claim to be interested in maximizing
GDP. Therefore, this result probably describes real-world policy choices in well-run countries (i.e. countries
whose governments are close to being benevolent) arguably well.
10This expression shows that the government chooses education expenditures for every in-
dividual i such that the increase in expected tax revenues due to a marginal increase in
education expenditures is equal to the costs. The costs of additional education expendi-
tures for a Leviathan government are twofold. First, it has to incur the direct unit costs of
education: providing one unit of additional education costs one unit of tax revenues. How-
ever, there is also a tax base eﬀect. As wealthier individuals are more likely to emigrate for
tax reasons, increased spending on education will incentivize more individuals to emigrate,




dgiνi = −t(t − tF)dνi
dgiνi < 0.









di = 0. (8)
This equation states that the tax rate is set such that in equilibrium, any additional revenues
due to a marginal increase in the tax rate are equal to the revenue losses due to emigration.
Equation (7) and (8) together deﬁne the equilibrium tax t = tl∗ and equilibrium education
expenditures gi = gl∗
i under a Leviathan government. It is obvious by comparing equations (5)
and (7) that even if a Leviathan government could set t = 1, education expenditures for type i
would be lower than under a benevolent government because the Leviathan government takes
into account that better educated individuals are more likely to emigrate, thereby depriving
the government of the opportunity to tax them.
3.3 Economic eﬀects of globalization
In this section, we describe the eﬀects of globalization on wages and mobility costs, which are
independent of the type of government. Prima facie, globalization is assumed to have two
direct eﬀects. On the one hand, it aﬀects wages for diﬀerent skill-types. On the other hand,
it reduces the costs of mobility. Via these two channels globalization indirectly inﬂuences the
tax rate and education expenditures that the government chooses in equilibrium, i.e. it will
eventually have ﬁscal eﬀects.
3.3.1 Globalization and wages
Trade theory suggests a link between the extent of economic integration and factor returns.
The Heckscher-Ohlin model and the related Stolper-Samuelson theorem, for example, state
that falling trade restrictions lead to an equalization of factor prices through an increase in
the trade of goods (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2005).
We therefore model the wage of individual i as a function of globalization G:
wi = wi(G). (9)
11How does globalization aﬀect the wage for individual i, i.e. what is the sign of dwi
dG ? Accord-
ing to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the sign of this expression depends on (i) the skill level of
individual i and (ii) whether she lives in a developing or industrialized country. Given that
industrialized countries are relatively abundant in high-skilled labor and developing countries
have a relative abundance in unskilled labor, one prediction of the Heckscher-Ohlin model
is that the returns to low-skilled labor increase in developing and decrease in industrialized
countries with deepening globalization, and vice versa for high-skilled labor. The empiri-
cal evidence, however, conﬁrms the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model only partially.
That is, globalization has apparently led to a relative rise in wages for high-skilled labor in
industrialized (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999) and developing countries (Goldberg and Pavenik,
2007).
3.3.2 Globalization and mobility costs
The mobility costs x can be understood as the monetary representation of the costs of losing
contact or keeping in touch with one’s social and professional networks, and as the costs of
relocating physical assets. One eﬀect of globalization is that it lowers transportation costs,
which implies that it becomes easier to visit one’s acquaintances in the home country, or to
relocate physical assets. Another eﬀect is the spread of English as a modern Lingua Franca
and the emergence of a global culture, both of which might reduce the non-monetary costs
when moving to a foreign country. It is therefore reasonable to assume that mobility costs
are a decreasing function of the extent of globalization, i.e., x = x(G) with dx
dG < 0.
3.4 Fiscal eﬀects of globalization
3.4.1 Comparative statics under a benevolent government
Deriving how globalization aﬀects education expenditures and taxation under a benevolent
government requires the implicit diﬀerentiation of equation 5 with respect to G. Rearranging












The sign of this expression is determined by dwi
dG . If globalization leads to an increase in
wages for an individual with skill-type i, dwi
dG > 0, the benevolent government will spend more
on education for that type. In contrast, if dwi
dG < 0, then the government will spend less for type
i. For example, if globalization leads to an increase in the returns for high-skilled labor and a
decrease in the returns for low-skilled labor in a country with a benevolent government, the
model predicts an increase in expenditures for higher education and a decrease in expenditures
for basic education.
123.4.2 Comparative statics under a Leviathan government
The comparative statics for Leviathan governments are more intricate than for benevolent
governments. For example, assume that globalization decreases mobility costs and increases
the wages for high-skilled labor. How do these eﬀects inﬂuence the government’s policies?
Decreasing mobility costs induce governments to cut tax rates. This means, ceteris paribus,
that fewer resources are available for public education across all educational stages. On the
other hand, rising wages for the high-skilled incentivize the government to expand expendi-
tures for higher education. This attempt to increase education expenditures will counteract
the incentives to decrease tax rates, possibly to such an extent that tax rates will be higher in
the new equilibrium. But then again, wealthier individuals are also more likely to emigrate.
This means that the Leviathan government has an incentive to decrease education expendi-
tures if wages increase in order to ensure that individuals’ gain from emigration is not ”too
large”. Reduced expenditures for education, in turn, enable the government to decrease the
tax rate to some extent in order to motivate more individuals to remain in the country.
In general, therefore, it is impossible to derive how education expenditures will react to
deepening globalization under a Leviathan government. The comparative statics of globaliza-
tion depend on the speciﬁc values of the parameters and variables at a particular equilibrium.
This can be formally shown by implicitly diﬀerentiating the system of equations given in (7)
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di = 0. (12)
As discussed above, it is not possible to sign either
dgi
dG or dt
dG given the various eﬀects and
diﬀering incentives with which a Leviathan government is confronted if globalization increases.
For example, the denominator on the right-hand side in equation (11) can be either positive or
negative, which implies that the right-hand side of this equation as a whole cannot be signed.
Given that
dgi
dG is indeterminate, it is not clear whether dt
dG will be positive or negative. Note
also that it is not possible to substitute for dt
dG in equation (11) with exogenous variables
because equation (12) cannot be explicitly solved for dt
dG.
133.4.3 Discussion
The model developed in the previous sections establishes a link between globalization and
diﬀerent types of education expenditures. If we are willing to assume that governments of
industrialized countries, at least to some degree, behave benevolently and if we accept the
empirical evidence regarding the eﬀects of globalization on wages for diﬀerent skill-types dis-
cussed in section 3.3.1, then we should observe a positive relationship between globalization
and higher education expenditures and presumably a negative relationship between glob-
alization and lower education expenditures.11 For developing countries, the assumption of
Leviathan governments might be on average more appropriate. Consequently, we cannot
make a clear prediction based on our model how globalization will aﬀect expenditures for dif-
ferent types of education in this group of countries. Given such ambiguities in the theoretical
model, we conduct an empirical analysis in the next section.
4 Data and methodology
4.1 Data description
The education expenditure data that we use in the following is obtained from the World
Bank’s Edstats database (original source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics).12 The data
is comprehensive in the sense that all education-relevant expenditures of public entities are
covered, including expenditures by diﬀerent tiers of government (Lassibille and Rasera, 1998).
Figure 1 is based on averages for developing and developed countries across the period from
1992 till 2006. The two bar charts illustrate to what extent spending for diﬀerent educational
programs (relative to GDP) diﬀers on average between these two country groups. They
suggest that OECD countries spend, relative to their GDP, less on primary education than
developing countries (1.39% vs. 1.78%). On the other hand, OECD countries spend more for
secondary (2.05% vs. 1.54%) and tertiary education (1.20% of GDP vs. 0.82% of GDP) than
developing countries.
It may appear surprising that primary education expenditures as a share of GDP are larger
in developing than in industrialized countries. One explanation are the higher fertility rates
in developing countries. As fertility rates decline (for example because of increased female
education), spending for primary education as a share of GDP will probably decline as well.13
11While the model would in no case predict that expenditures for lower education increase if returns for
low-skilled labor decline, this might be possible in reality if high-skilled individuals beneﬁt suﬃciently from
lower education; see the discussion in section 3.1.
12The Edstats database provides data on primary, secondary and tertiary education expenditures as a share
of total education expenditures. We construct the data for expenditures on the three educational stages as
a share of GDP by multiplying expenditures on the three educational stages as a share of total education
expenditures by total education expenditures as a share of GDP. The data for total education expenditures as
a share of GDP is from the Edstats database as well.
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Figure 1: Public education expenditures in % of GDP, 1992 - 2006
Source: World Bank Edstats database
To measure globalization, we use two proxies: the KOF-Index (Dreher, 2006) and the
trade openness measure (at constant prices) from the Penn World Tables. The KOF-Index
is based on three sub-indexes which capture the extent of economic, social, and political
globalization (e.g. actual economic ﬂows, economic restrictions, data on information ﬂows,
data on personal contact, and data on cultural proximity). The KOF-Index consequently
provides a more comprehensive picture than the traditionally used trade openness measure.
Nonetheless, we also use the trade openness measure from the Penn World Tables as a second
proxy for global economic integration to examine the robustness of the results. The evolution
of the two measures of economic integration is plotted separately for developed and developing
countries from 1992 onwards in ﬁgure 2.
Both measures suggest that globalization has increased in the two country groups. The
extent of trade openness is higher for developing than for developed countries throughout the
entire period from 1992 to 2006. This observation can be attributed to the fact that poor
countries are in general more dependent on international trade. In contrast, the KOF-Index
has been at least 20 points higher in developed countries during this period, which may reﬂect
the fact that in terms of cultural proximity and information ﬂows wealthier countries are more
globalized. The diﬀerences between the two globalization measures underline the rationale
for including both of them in the regression analysis.
The ﬁrst control variable that we include in the panel data estimations is the ﬁrst lag of the
dependent variable in order to capture dynamic eﬀects in the composition of public education
expenditures. Further control variables are: (i) the gross enrollment rate in the relevant
educational stage and its prior stages14, which represents the demand for the respective type
14That is, when explaining primary education expenditures, we control for gross primary enrollment. When
explaining secondary education expenditures, we control for gross primary and gross secondary enrollment.
And when explaining tertiary education expenditures, we control for gross primary, gross secondary, and gross
tertiary enrollment. As noted by an anonymous referee, it is important to control for gross enrollment in prior
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Figure 2: Evolution of globalization over time, 1992 - 2006
Sources: Penn World Tables and Dreher (2006)
of education; (ii) GDP per capita, which captures how a country’s income level is related to the
structure of education expenditures; (iii) a measure of government ideology15, which controls
for systematic partisan biases in education expenditures; (iv) an index of democracy16, which
measures to what extent the government is accountable to the electorate and (v) the number
of internet users per 100 persons as a measure for technological progress. The latter is
a particularly important control variable. By including the number of internet users, we
attempt to distinguish between changes in spending for the three educational programs that
are due to country-speciﬁc technological change (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987, 1991), and
changes due to globalization.
The unbalanced panel covers altogether 104 countries, both developing and developed, over
the 1992 - 2006 period.17 Summary statistics, variable deﬁnitions, and data sources for all
variables used in the subsequent regressions are collected in table A.1; a list of the countries
that are considered in this study can be found in table A.2. Both tables are in the appendix.
4.2 Empirical strategy
We estimate three dynamic panel data models to analyze the eﬀect of globalization on pri-
mary, secondary, and tertiary public education expenditures relative to GDP. In order to
take into account that the overall eﬀect of globalization may diﬀer between developing and
industrialized countries, the models are speciﬁed as follows:
later stages. For example, the government will ﬁnd it easier to increase spending for tertiary education if gross
primary and gross secondary enrollment rates are already high.
15The ideology variable is derived from the DPI dataset. Whereas this dataset distinguishes between right,
center, left, and other governments, we use, for compactness, a 0 - 1 classiﬁcation. We code observations with
governments that are explicitly identiﬁed as left-wing as 1 and all other observations as 0.
16The index is 1 when citizens have the highest and 7 when they have the lowest amount of political rights.
17Since ﬁxed eﬀects are included in equation 13, each of the countries in the sample has at least two non-
missing observations during the time frame of the analysis.
16Expenditure/GDPit =δGlobalizationit × INDi + γGlobalizationit × DEVi
+ αExpenditure/GDPi,t−1 + xitβ + ωt + λi + ǫit,
(13)
where Expenditure/GDPit is public education expenditures allocated to primary, secondary,
or tertiary education relative to GDP, Expenditure/GDPi,t−1 represents the lag of the de-
pendent variable, λi are the country ﬁxed eﬀects, ωt are the year ﬁxed eﬀects, xit represents
a vector of control variables, and ǫit is the error term.
Two variables are used in equation 13 to allow us to investigate diﬀerences in the eﬀect
of globalization on education expenditures across country groups. The ﬁrst variable is con-
structed by interacting a measure of globalization with a dummy variable, INDi, that is 1
for industrialized countries and else 0. The second variable interacts the same measure of
globalization with a dummy variable, DEVi, that is 1 for developing countries and else 0. We
classify all countries as either industrialized or developing (see table A.2).18 We are inter-
ested in the estimates for δ and γ, the coeﬃcients on the interaction variables: δ measures the
eﬀect of globalization in industrialized countries, whereas γ measures its eﬀect in developing
countries.
Note that we do not include industrialized and developing country dummies, i.e., the “lower-
order” eﬀects of these dummies, as separate control variables in equation 13 because they are
multicollinear with the country ﬁxed eﬀects. We also do not include a lower-order eﬀect
for the globalization variable because it is multi-collinear with a linear combination of the
interaction eﬀects. It may seem that the non-inclusion of the lower-order eﬀects leads to an
omitted variable bias (Braumoeller, 2004). This concern is, however, unwarranted.19
Due to the presence of ﬁxed eﬀects and the lagged dependent variable in equation 13,
pooled OLS estimations are inconsistent. However, it is well-known that the application of
the within-estimator to dynamic models also yields biased estimates (Nickell, 1981). While
the within-estimator is consistent and the Nickell-bias can be ignored when T is large, this
bias may be serious in panels with a small time dimension. Since T is on average around 6
in our dataset (even though observations are in principle available from 1992-2006, there are
18Any classiﬁcation of countries as industrialized or developing is of course arbitrary. We classify only
countries that were members of the OECD at some point during the sample period as industrialized. Therefore,
the term developing as used in this paper should not be understood as being synonymous with, for example,
the Least Developed Countries (LDC). It should rather be understood as encompassing all countries except
the most wealthy.
19To see why, note that the complete speciﬁcation of a model with country ﬁxed eﬀects and interactions of a
continuous control variable with a dummy variable is: yit = αi+β1di+β2xit+β3dixit+ǫit, with di ∈ {0,1} (we
omit other control variables for brevity). Thus, β2 is the marginal eﬀect of x when di = 0 whereas β2+β3 is the
marginal eﬀect when di = 1. This expression is equivalent to yit = αi+β1di+β2(dixit+(1−di)xit)+β3dixit+ǫit,
which can be rewritten as yit = αi+β1di+β2(1−di)xit+(β2+β3)dixit+ǫit, or yit = zi+γcixit+δdixit+ǫit,
with zi = αi+β1di, ci = (1−di),γ = β2,δ = (β2+β3). This last expression has the same structure as equation
13. Since it is equivalent to the complete speciﬁcation, the same is true for equation 13.
17missing variables), it is obvious that more sophisticated estimation methods are required for
the empirical analysis.
Several IV and GMM estimators have been developed in order to deal with the bias in
dynamic panel data models. For models where it cannot be assumed that disturbances are
spherical, the Arellano-Bond Diﬀerence GMM and Blundell-Bond System GMM estimators
outperform their alternatives (Roodman, 2009a). Between these two, the choice of the ap-
propriate estimator depends on whether the dependent variable is persistent or not since for
persistent dependent variables the Diﬀerence-GMM estimator gives rise to ﬁnite sample bi-
ases. In this case, the System-GMM estimator is recommended (Blundell and Bond, 1998,
2000). Since education expenditures are likely to be persistent, we apply the robust one-
step System-GMM estimator. Moreover, we use a collapsed “GMM-style” instruments set to
address the instrument proliferation problem (Roodman, 2009b).
5 Estimation results
5.1 Baseline regressions
The results for the System-GMM estimations of model 13 are collected in table 1. In the ﬁrst
three models (column 2 to 4), the KOF-Index is used as the proxy for globalization, while
the last three models (column 5 to 7) are estimated using the trade openness measure. There
are three models for each globalization proxy due to the use of multiple dependent variables:
primary, secondary, and tertiary education expenditures relative to GDP.
First, note that the diagnostic tests reported at the bottom of table 1 conﬁrm the validity
of the set of instruments for all models. This can be deduced from the fact that the Hansen-J
overidentiﬁcation test is never rejected, while in addition second-order autocorrelation in the
diﬀerenced errors is not found for any of the models (ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in the diﬀer-
enced errors is expected and does not invalidate the estimates). The number of instruments is
also smaller than the number of cross-sections, so that a bias due to instrument proliferation
is not likely (see also section 5.2 for the ﬁndings from robustness checks).
The estimates suggest that deepening globalization leads to lower spending for primary
and more spending for tertiary education in both industrialized and developing countries.
The coeﬃcients for globalization when the KOF-Index is used are negative in the model
for primary and positive in the models for secondary and tertiary education expenditures.
The coeﬃcients are, except for primary education expenditures, at least signiﬁcant at the
10% level. However, note that the z-statistics are relatively large in the primary education
expenditures regressions.
The results are qualitatively similar when the openness measure of globalization is used
even though the coeﬃcients are consistently insigniﬁcant. This is in line with our expectations
since the KOF-Index is a more comprehensive measure of globalization than trade openness.
18Another noteworthy diﬀerence to the results with the KOF-Index is that openness has a
positive eﬀect on primary education expenditures in developing countries even though the
z-statistic is low for this coeﬃcient.
We summarize these results as follows. For industrialized and developing countries, the
evidence suggests a negative relationship between the KOF-Index and primary education
expenditures, while the results are less convincing when the openness measure is used. The
evidence regarding secondary and tertiary education expenditures suggests that globalization
has increased spending for these types of educational programs in both industrialized and
developing countries. Again, the eﬀects are stronger when the KOF-Index is used.
The magnitudes of the estimated coeﬃcients for the globalization variables are remark-
ably similar for industrialized and developing countries. A 1-point increase in the KOF-Index
reduces the share of primary education expenditures relative to GDP by around 0.008 percent-
age points in industrialized and by about 0.006 percentage points in developing countries. At
the same time, a 1-point increase in the KOF-Index is associated with a rise in the secondary
education expenditure to GDP ratio by 0.014 percentage points in industrialized and 0.015
percentage points in developing countries. With respect to tertiary education expenditures,
we ﬁnd that a 1-point increase in the KOF-Index results in spending increases of 0.007 and
0.008 percentage points in industrialized and developing countries, respectively.
Considering that the average increase in the KOF-index was about 10 points for industrial-
ized and about 15 points for developing countries over the 1992 - 2006 period (see ﬁgure 1), the
estimated coeﬃcients for the globalization variables point towards signiﬁcant readjustments
in educational spending. According to our estimations, globalization has reduced primary
education expenditures on average by 0.08% of GDP in industrialized countries during the
1992-2006 period. Given that average primary education expenditures in industrialized coun-
tries amounted to 1.39% of GDP during the sample period (see ﬁgure 1), a reduction of 0.08
percentage points implies an average decline of about 6% in the primary education expendi-
ture to GDP ratio relative to the average of this ratio during the sample period. Similarly,
secondary education expenditures in industrialized countries increased by about about 7%
and tertiary education expenditures by about 6%, relative to the average in industrialized
countries during the sample period. For developing countries, the respective decline in pri-
mary education expenditures is about 5%, the increase in secondary education expenditures
is about 15%, and the increase in tertiary education expenditures is about 15% as well.
With regard to the trade openness measure, the eﬀects appear much smaller at ﬁrst sight.
However, as ﬁgure 2 shows, this measure has a wider value range than the KOF-Index.
Nevertheless, the estimated eﬀects of globalization are indeed somewhat smaller when the
openness measure instead of the KOF-Index is used. The 38 and 21 point increases in the
trade openness measure over the 1992 - 2006 period suggest, for example, an average increase
in the share of tertiary education expenditures relative to GDP by around 0.038 percentage
19Table 1: Globalization and education expenditures (% of GDP) in 1992–2006, System
GMM
Dependent variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp.
KOF - Globalization Index Openness (Penn World Tables)
Prim. edu. exp./GDPt−1 0.461* 0.610**
(1.805) (2.397)
Sec. edu. exp./GDPt−1 0.418** 0.561***
(2.105) (2.918)
Tert. edu. exp./GDPt−1 0.528** 0.677***
(2.298) (4.287)
Primary enrollment 0.006 -0.004 -0.000 0.004 -0.003 0.000
(0.991) (-1.179) (-0.107) (0.748) (-1.231) (0.022)
Secondary enrollment 0.000 -0.002 0.004 -0.000
(0.089) (-1.366) (1.259) (-0.453)
Tertiary enrollment 0.002 0.003**
(1.528) (2.115)
GDP per capita -0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.005
(-0.194) (-0.502) (0.834) (-0.566) (0.174) (1.504)
Internet users 0.003 0.004** 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001
(1.281) (2.013) (1.433) (1.139) (1.292) (0.597)
Democracy 0.003 0.011 0.030* 0.020 0.005 0.022**
(0.098) (0.285) (1.908) (0.962) (0.155) (2.062)
Government ideology 0.007 0.105* 0.056 0.032 0.131** 0.049
(0.117) (1.713) (1.133) (0.569) (2.179) (1.338)
KOF-Index × IND -0.008 0.014** 0.007**
(-1.536) (2.516) (2.149)
KOF-Index × DEV -0.006 0.015*** 0.008**
(-1.406) (2.635) (2.118)
Openness × IND -0.001 0.001 0.001
(-0.971) (0.750) (1.568)
Openness × DEV 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.692) (1.208) (1.329)
N 529 523 530 544 536 546
χ2 127.938 482.166 548.315 276.525 588.228 915.269
Hansen-test (p-val.) 0.437 0.344 0.654 0.244 0.377 0.323
AR(1)-test (p-val.) 0.111 0.024 0.047 0.053 0.022 0.003
AR(2)-test (p-val.) 0.556 0.153 0.287 0.934 0.149 0.286
Instruments No. 33 36 37 33 36 37
1 Stars indicate signiﬁcance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***)
2 z-statistics in parentheses
3 Year ﬁxed eﬀects included in all models
4 The p-values for the Hansen overidentiﬁcation test, the p-values for the Arellano-Bond AR(1) and AR(2) tests, and the number
of instruments are reported at the bottom of the table
5 Hypothesis tests are based on one-step robust standard errors
6 The GMM-style instruments set has been collapsedpoints in industrialized and by about 0.021 percentage points in developing countries. Relative
to average spending for this educational stage during the sample period, these increases imply
a rise of about 3% in both industrialized and developing countries relative to the average of
this ratio during the sample period. (However, one should bear in mind that the coeﬃcients
are insigniﬁcant in these estimations).
The remaining control variables perform reasonably. The lagged dependent variable is
signiﬁcantly positive with a coeﬃcient between 0.4 and 0.7 for all expenditure categories,
suggesting a high degree of persistence in education expenditures. We also ﬁnd that the
number of internet users, which is used as a proxy for technological progress, is positively
related to all three types of education expenditures. While the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant in
only one case, it consistently displays large z-statistics. Hence, we conclude that technological
progress leads to an expansion of all types of education. Enrollment rates have in general an
insigniﬁcant eﬀect on spending. The only exception is the eﬀect of the tertiary enrollment rate
on tertiary education expenditures. This variable is consistently positive; it is also signiﬁcant
in the openness regression.
Another interesting result is that the democracy index is signiﬁcantly positive for tertiary
education expenditures. Taking into account the inverted scaling of the democracy index
(see table A.2), these estimates imply that more democratic countries spend less on tertiary
education. This can be attributed to the fact that more democracy usually implies an ex-
tension of political rights to the less wealthy parts of society. These groups in turn beneﬁt
less from tertiary education. Alternatively, non-democratic countries could spend more on
tertiary education because the children of the elite beneﬁt the most from this type of ed-
ucation. While the coeﬃcient for democracy is also positive in the regressions for primary
and secondary education expenditures, it displays low z-statistics and is far from signiﬁcant.
There is thus no robust evidence that democracy has any eﬀect on primary and secondary
education expenditures.
The coeﬃcient for GDP per capita is insigniﬁcant in all models. Finally, the coeﬃcient for
government ideology is consistently positive. It is signiﬁcant in the secondary education ex-
penditures. More generally, the estimated coeﬃcient displays relatively high z-statistics in the
secondary and tertiary education expenditures regressions, but low z-statistics in the primary
education expenditures regressions. There is thus weak evidence that left-wing governments
spend more than right-wing governments on secondary and possibly tertiary education, but
no evidence for partisan biases with respect to primary education expenditures.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
This section provides the results for three robustness checks that are conducted in addition to
using two diﬀerent globalization measures. The estimations in tables 2 and 3 address potential
21deﬁciencies of the baseline estimations from an econometric viewpoint. To save space, we only
report the estimates for the globalization variables. The full results are available upon request.
The ﬁrst robustness check involves a re-estimation of the models in table 1 by means of a
two-step procedure using the Windmeijer-correction instead of the robust one-step procedure.
While the two-step procedure is asymptotically eﬃcient and robust to arbitrary forms of het-
eroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the Windmeijer-correction has been designed to deal with
a potential ﬁnite sample bias in the calculation of the associated standard errors. Without
the correction, a downward bias in the standard errors is possible (Windmeijer, 2005).
Generally, we ﬁnd that the results in table 2 conﬁrm the conclusions drawn with regard to
the estimation results in table 1. Globalization reduces primary education expenditures and
increases secondary and tertiary education expenditures. The most noteworthy diﬀerence to
the baseline regression is that the coeﬃcient for the KOF-Index is signiﬁcant in the primary
education expenditure model for industrialized countries. The coeﬃcient estimates in the
regressions for secondary and tertiary education expenditures for the KOF-Index continue
to be signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level. The coeﬃcients for the openness measure are
insigniﬁcant as in the baseline regressions, and their signs display the same pattern.
The second robustness check addresses the instruments proliferation bias problem. Rood-
man (2009b) argues that when too many instruments are used, the Hansen J-test for instru-
ment validity becomes unreliable. In tables 1 and 2 we have addressed this issue by collapsing
the instruments matrix. An alternative approach pursued in table 3 is to only use the ﬁrst
lags as instruments.
The estimation results in table 3 are based on the same models as in tables 1 and 2. Overall,
the estimation results are once again similar to the baseline regressions. We ﬁnd that the
KOF-Index indicates a positive eﬀect of globalization on secondary and tertiary education
expenditures and a negative eﬀect on primary education expenditures in both industrialized
and developing countries. In this set of regressions, the coeﬃcients for the KOF-Index in the
primary education expenditures model are even signiﬁcant for both industrialized and devel-
oping countries. The signs are similar when the openness measure is used, but the coeﬃcients
continue to be insigniﬁcant. Nevertheless, the results suggest that globalization increases
secondary and tertiary education expenditures in both industrialized and developing coun-
tries. They also suggest – with less ambiguity than the previously reported regressions – that
globalization reduces primary education expenditures in both industrialized and developing
countries as the estimated coeﬃcient for globalization is consistently negative in the relevant
regressions.
The third and ﬁnal robustness check replaces the denominator of the dependent variables
(GDP) with total education expenditures. Analyzing the implications of globalization for
expenditures for primary, secondary, and tertiary education relative to total education expen-
ditures allows us to ascertain how globalization aﬀects governments’ educational priorities.
22Table 2: Robustness check I: Two-step standard errors with Windmeijer-
correction
Dependent variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp.
KOF - Globalization Index Openness (Penn World Tables)
KOF-Index × IND -0.009* 0.010* 0.006**
(-1.710) (1.913) (2.092)
KOF-Index × DEV -0.008 0.010* 0.007**
(-1.557) (1.863) (2.060)
Openness × IND -0.001 0.001 0.001
(-0.611) (0.778) (1.580)
Openness × DEV 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.461) (1.076) (1.605)
Additional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 529 523 530 544 536 546
χ2 119.147 604.667 560.525 212.909 776.717 682.641
Hansen-test (p-val.) 0.437 0.344 0.654 0.244 0.377 0.323
AR(1)-test (p-val.) 0.233 0.101 0.028 0.156 0.097 0.004
AR(2)-test (p-val.) 0.500 0.231 0.297 0.995 0.234 0.295
Instruments No. 33 36 37 33 36 37
1 This table presents results for the globalization variables a robustness check where two-step standard errors with the
Windmeijer-correction (instead of one-step robust standard errors) are used for hypothesis tests. The speciﬁcation is
otherwise identical to that reported in table 1. Full results are available upon request.
2 Stars indicate signiﬁcance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***)
3 z-statistics in parentheses
4 Year ﬁxed eﬀects included in all models
5 The p-values for the Hansen overidentiﬁcation test, the p-values for the Arellano-Bond AR(1) and AR(2) tests, and
the number of instruments are reported at the bottom of the table
6 Hypothesis tests are based on one-step robust standard errors
7 The GMM-style instruments set has been collapsed
As discussed further above, it is possible that high-skilled individuals beneﬁt to some extent
from primary education. This eﬀect would tend to limit any reduction in primary educa-
tion expenditures even if returns to high-skilled individuals have increased and returns to
low-skilled individuals have declined due to globalization and the government is interested in
maximizing national income. Consequently, analyzing only spending as share of GDP might
result in a distorted picture of the shift in the government’s educational priorities (i.e. one
that under-values the reduction in the importance that the government attaches to primary
education).
23Table 3: Robustness check II: Restricted lag length
Dependent variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp.
KOF - Globalization Index Openness (Penn World Tables)
KOF-Index × IND -0.003** 0.008*** 0.003***
(-1.966) (2.666) (3.202)
KOF-Index × DEV -0.003** 0.009*** 0.003***
(-2.259) (2.865) (2.763)
Openness × IND -0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.176) (0.625) (1.408)
Openness × DEV -0.000 0.001 0.000
(-0.280) (1.146) (0.795)
Additional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 529 523 530 544 536 546
χ2 2354.022 1364.868 3881.607 2466.357 1213.209 3747.386
Hansen-test (p-val.) 0.200 0.459 0.317 0.165 0.383 0.334
AR(1)-test (p-val.) 0.000 0.055 0.001 0.000 0.039 0.001
AR(2)-test (p-val.) 0.972 0.188 0.314 0.689 0.175 0.307
Instruments No. 39 48 48 39 48 48
1 This table presents results for the globalization variables from a robustness checks where the lag length of the GMM-
style instruments for the lagged dependent variable is limited to 1. The speciﬁcation is otherwise identical to that
reported in table 1. Full results are available upon request.
2 Stars indicate signiﬁcance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***)
3 z-statistics in parentheses
4 Year ﬁxed eﬀects included in all models
5 The p-values for the Hansen overidentiﬁcation test, the p-values for the Arellano-Bond AR(1) and AR(2) tests, and
the number of instruments are reported at the bottom of the table
6 Hypothesis tests are based on one-step robust standard errors
7 The GMM-style instruments set has been collapsed
Table 4 summarizes the results for these additional estimations.20 Note that the estimated
coeﬃcients are consistent with the baseline results and that their statistical signiﬁcance is
higher. Both the regressions with the KOF-Index and the openness measure suggest that
globalization reduces the share of primary education expenditures and increases the share
of secondary and tertiary education expenditures. For the KOF-Index regressions, the co-
eﬃcients are always highly signiﬁcant. When the openness measure is used, two of the six
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant as well. Overall, this robustness check indicates once more that
the educational priorities of governments in both the industrialized and the developing world
20The speciﬁcation of these models is largely identical to that described in equation 13. The only diﬀerence is
that for each spending category, all three enrollment shares are simultaneously included since relative spending
is analyzed. Full results are available upon request.
24Table 4: Robustness check III: Education expenditures for primary, secondary,
and tertiary education relative to total education expenditures
Dependent variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp. educ. exp.
KOF - Globalization Index Openness (Penn World Tables)
KOF-Index × IND -0.179** 0.126** 0.130***
(-2.410) (2.222) (2.962)
KOF-Index × DEV -0.182** 0.137** 0.122***
(-2.454) (2.398) (2.693)
Openness × IND -0.025* -0.000 0.019*
(-1.733) (-0.040) (1.917)
Openness × DEV -0.013 -0.000 0.007
(-1.558) (-0.034) (0.795)
Additional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 457 465 535 470 478 551
χ2 500.011 258.193 386.443 583.361 256.829 565.534
Hansen-test (p-val.) 0.774 0.411 0.811 0.847 0.230 0.807
AR(1)-test (p-val.) 0.028 0.002 0.012 0.020 0.002 0.004
AR(2)-test (p-val.) 0.269 0.643 0.215 0.271 0.737 0.304
Instruments No. 35 37 37 35 37 37
1 This table presents results for the globalization variables a robustness check where where expenditures for primary,
secondary, and tertiary education relative to total education expenditures (instead of expenditures relative to GDP)
are used as dependent variables. The speciﬁcation is mostly identical to that reported in table 1, the only exception
is that the three enrollment variables are jointly included in all regressions. Full results available upon request.
2 Stars indicate signiﬁcance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***)
3 z-statistics in parentheses
4 Year ﬁxed eﬀects included in all models
5 The p-values for the Hansen overidentiﬁcation test, the p-values for the Arellano-Bond AR(1) and AR(2) tests, and
the number of instruments are reported at the bottom of the table
6 Hypothesis tests are based on one-step robust standard errors
7 The GMM-style instruments set has been collapsed
have shifted because of globalization: primary education has become less important while
higher education has become more important.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we ﬁrst derived theoretically that globalization aﬀects public education expen-
ditures through two separate channels. On the one hand, globalization changes the wages for
diﬀerent types of labor. This eﬀect incentivizes governments to spend more on higher educa-
tion. On the other hand, globalization inﬂuences education expenditures via the equilibrium
tax rate. We derived that if the government is benevolent, globalization will result in higher
25expenditures for those educational programs for which returns increase. However, when the
government is a Leviathan, the implications of globalization on education expenditures can-
not be predicted theoretically. We conclude that the relationship between globalization and
public spending for diﬀerent types of education is an empirical matter.
We therefore explored in a second step the eﬀect of globalization on public expenditures
for primary, secondary, and tertiary education empirically with data from 104 countries over
the 1992 - 2006 period. The estimation results suggest that globalization has led, relative to
GDP and relative to total education expenditures, to lower spending for primary and higher
spending for secondary and tertiary education in both industrialized and developing countries.
It is clear that educational policies have distributional consequences by aﬀecting the in-
comes of individuals. Real-world governments have a wider set of goals than maximizing
national income or tax revenues, among which distributional equity is presumably one of the
more important ones. The fact that globalization shifts educational priorities toward higher
education may therefore be perceived as problematic. As argued previously, students from
socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds beneﬁt predominantly from primary educa-
tion expenditures, while students with a wealthy background beneﬁt from tertiary education
expenditures. Thus, the eﬀects of globalization on public education expenditures identiﬁed
in this paper may widen the gap between rich and poor in the long-run.21 Consequently,
governments may want to develop strategies to counteract this potential source of inequality
in order to sustain support for economic openness.
While this paper provides insights on the relationship between globalization and educational
policies, its scope is limited to public education expenditures. This paper can therefore be
extended in several ways. First, the interactions between globalization and private education
expenditures could be analyzed in more detail given that private educational institutions
play an important role in many countries. Second, it might be worthwhile to investigate
whether globalization and related processes such as immigration have led to institutional
reforms of public education systems, such as the extent to which academic tracking takes
place (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2006), and whether such reforms have been successful in
addressing the educational challenges due to globalization. Extending this paper along these
lines is therefore a promising avenue for future research.
21Note that this result is in line with the existing evidence for globalization’s aggravating inﬂuence on income
inequality (Bergh and Nilsson, 2010). In a similar vein, Hessami (2011) provides evidence that globalization
has increased the well-being of high-income earners more than that of low-income earners.
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30Table A.1: Summary Statistics, definitions, and data sources
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs Deﬁnition Source
Primary education expenditures/GDP overall 1.58 0.73 0.33 5.65 544 Primary education exp. World Bank Edstats
between 0.84 0.49 5.57 88 as a share of GDP database
within 0.26 0.34 2.91 6.18
Secondary education expenditures/GDP overall 1.87 0.73 0.18 5.64 536 Secondary education exp. World Bank Edstats
between 0.75 0.19 4.43 85 as a share of GDP database
within 0.28 0.78 3.08 6.31
Tertiary education expenditures/GDP overall 1.05 0.55 0.14 5.07 546 Tertiary education exp. World Bank Edstats
between 0.53 0.14 2.99 87 as a share of GDP database
within 0.23 -0.13 3.14 6.28
KOF-Index overall 66.40 14.99 27.44 92.14 646 KOF-Index of globalization Dreher, 2006
between 14.62 29.40 90.89 100
within 4.69 43.68 78.60 6.46
Openness overall 80.79 39.51 16.64 210.27 664 (Exports + Imports)/GDP Penn World Tables 6.3
between 38.19 22.90 195.33 104 in constant prices
within 12.41 26.45 133.57 6.38
Primary enrollment overall 103.27 10.90 27.85 154.62 664 Primary gross enrollment World Bank Edstats
between 13.35 28.15 146.70 104 ratio database
within 4.01 83.47 133.26 6.38
Secondary enrollment overall 86.50 27.94 6.35 161.78 647 Secondary gross enrollment World Bank Edstats
between 30.47 6.43 148.68 104 ratio database
within 5.98 57.71 112.07 6.22
Tertiary enrollment overall 38.98 23.93 1.00 93.68 587 Tertiary gross enrollment World Bank Edstats
between 22.91 1.17 79.41 98 ratio database
within 9.42 3.55 90.49 5.99
GDP per capita overall 15.39 11.39 0.59 47.25 664 PPP-adjusted real GDP Penn World Tables 6.3
between 10.77 0.62 42.90 104 per capita in thousands
within 2.29 2.99 25.93 6.38
Internet users overall 17.37 22.03 0 85.90 664 Internet users per 100 people World Development
between 14.35 0.00 55.03 104 Indicators
within 15.86 -32.56 56.72 6.38
Democracy overall 2.53 2.04 1 7 664 Index of political rights Freedom House
between 2.13 1 7 104 scaled from 1 = most free,
within 0.43 0.36 6.03 6.38 7 = least free
Government ideology overall 0.36 0.48 0 1 664 Index of government ideology Own construction based
between 0.40 0 1 104 regarding economic policy on DPI (Beck et al., 2001)
within 0.31 -0.54 1.22 6.38 (left-wing = 1, else = 0)
Primary education expenditures/TOT overall 30.56 10.33 13.16 74.36 470 Primary education exp. World Bank Edstats
between 11.28 14.76 69.47 76 as a share of total database
within 3.57 14.29 49.01 6.18 education exp.
Secondary education expenditures/TOT overall 37.44 8.82 9.13 57.67 478 Secondary education exp. World Bank Edstats
between 8.91 9.25 54.84 75 as a share of total database
within 4.23 9.98 53.14 6.37 education exp.
Tertiary education expenditures/TOT overall 19.92 6.63 4.24 36.82 551 Tertiary education exp. World Bank Edstats
between 6.42 4.74 35.00 87 as a share of database
within 3.18 1.33 32.68 6.33 total education exp.
1 The number of observations reported here is larger than in the regression tables because our estimations include lagged variables.Table A.2: Countries included in the sample
Argentina Ecuador Laos Portugal (I)
Australia (I) El Salvador Latvia Romania
Austria (I) Eritrea Lebanon Russia
Azerbaijan Estonia Lesotho Samoa
Bahrain Finland (I) Lithuania Senegal
Belarus France (I) Macedonia Slovak Republic (I)
Belgium (I) Gambia, The Madagascar Slovenia
Belize Germany (I) Malaysia South Africa
Bolivia Greece (I) Maldives Spain (I)
Brazil Guatemala Mauritius St. Lucia
Bulgaria Guyana Mexico (I) Swaziland
Burundi Hungary (I) Mongolia Sweden (I)
Cambodia Iceland (I) Morocco Syria
Cameroon India Namibia Tajikistan
Canada (I) Indonesia Nepal Thailand
Cape Verde Iran Netherlands (I) Togo
Chad Ireland (I) New Zealand (I) Trinidad &Tobago
Chile Israel Nicaragua Tunisia
China Italy (I) Niger Turkey (I)
Colombia Jamaica Norway (I) Ukraine
Costa Rica Japan (I) Oman United Arab Emirates
Cote d‘Ivoire Kazakhstan Panama United Kingdom (I)
Cuba Kenya Paraguay United States (I)
Cyprus Korea, Republic of (I) Peru Uruguay
Czech Republic (I) Kuwait Philippines Vanuatu
Denmark (I) Kyrgyzstan Poland (I) Zambia
1 This table lists all countries that are included in at least one of the estimated models
2 Countries classiﬁed as “industrialized” are indicated with an “I” in parentheses (see footnote 18 for an explanation
of the criteria according to which a country is classiﬁed as developing or industrialized)
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